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I. INTRODUCTION
As a goal for civilized nations, abolition of the death penalty was
promoted during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' in 1948. It found, however, that expression was only implicit in
the recognition of what international human rights law designated "the
right to life;" the same approach was taken in the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted May 4, 1948.2 At the time, all but
a handful of states maintained the death penalty. In the aftermath of a
brutal struggle which took hundreds of millions of lives, few were even
contemplating its abolition. The idea of abolition gained momentum over
the following decades. International lawmakers urged the limitation of the
death penalty, by excluding juveniles, pregnant women, and the elderly
from its scope and by restricting it to an ever-shrinking list of serious
crimes. Enhanced procedural safeguards were required where the death
penalty still remained. In several subsequent international human rights
instruments, notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,3 the European Convention on Human Rights,4 and the American
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1. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948), art. 3.
2. O.A.S. Doe. OEAISer.L.IVII.4 (1948), art. I.
3. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6.
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Convention on Human Rights,, the death penalty is mentioned as a
carefully-worded exception to the right to life. From a normative
standpoint, the right to life protects the individual against the death penalty
unless otherwise provided as an implicit or express exception. Eventually,
three international instruments were drafted that proclaimed the abolition
of the death penalty. The first instrument was adopted in 1983 and the
others at the end of the 1980s.6 Fifty-one States are now bound by these
international legal norms abolishing the death penalty, 7 and the number
should continue to grow rapidly.' Fifty years after the Nuremberg trials,
the international community has now ruled out the possibility of capital
punishment in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity.9
The importance of international standard setting was evidenced by
parallel developments in domestic laws. In 1945, there were only a
handful of abolitionist states. By 1997, considerably more than half the
countries in the world abolished the death penalty de facto or de jure.
4. 213 U.N.T.S. 221, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, art. 2§1.
5. American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force Jul.
18, 1978.
6. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, E.T.S. no. 114, entered into force
Mar. 30, 1985; Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Aiming at Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, entered into force Jul. 7,
1991; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, O.A.S.T.S. no. 73, 29 I.L.M. 1447, entered into force Oct. 6, 1993. The American
Convention on Human Rights, is also an abolitionist instrument because it prevents countries that
have already abolished the death penalty from reintroducing it. Thus, a State which has
abolished the death penalty at the time of ratification of the American Convention is abolitionist
from the standpoint of international law. Id.
7. Andorra, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, San Marino,
Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela.
These States are abolitionist either de jure or de facto, and have either signed or ratified one or
more of the abolitionist treaties (Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to
Human Rights, 18 HUM. RTS. L. J. 79 (1997)).
8. Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine
have indicated their intention to be bound by international norms prohibiting the death penalty,
either by signing an abolitionist instrument or by publicly declaring their intention to ratify.
9. The Security Council has excluded use of the death penalty by the two international ad
hoc tribunals created to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S/RES/827 (1993), annex, art.
24(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S/RES/955 (1994) annex, art.
23(1). The International Law Commission has also excluded the death penalty in its draft statute
for an international criminal tribunal: U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), art. 47.
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Those that still retain it find themselves increasingly subject to
international pressure in favor of abolition. Sometimes the pressure is
quite direct. One example is the refusal by certain countries to grant
extradition where a fugitive will be exposed to a capital sentence.
Abolition of the death penalty is generally considered to be an important
element in democratic development for states breaking with a past
characterized by terror, injustice, and repression. In some cases, abolition
is affected by explicit reference in constitutional instruments to the
international treaties that prohibit the death penalty. In others, it has been
the contribution of the judiciary (judges applying constitutions that make
no specific mention of the death penalty but that enshrine the right to life
and that prohibit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment). 0
Several recent works provide detailed overviews of international
legal issues relating to abolition of the death penalty." The intention of
this article is considerably more modest: to update the existing material by
addressing recent developments in international law. Three subjects are
considered; the ongoing debate within international organizations including
the United Nations and European institutions, the issue of the death penalty
and general sentencing matters involved in establishment of the
international criminal court, and the growing refusal of states to extradite
to the United States of America in cases where fugitives are subject to the
death penalty.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The first truly international trials were held in the aftermath of the
Second World War and in many cases led to capital executions. The
Charter of the International Military Tribunal authorized the Nuremberg
court to impose upon a convicted war criminal "death or such other
punishment as shall be determined by it to be just."' 2 Many of the Nazi
defendants were condemned to death, although a few received lengthy
prison terms and some were acquitted. The Soviet judge expressed the
10. Makwanyane & Mchunu v. The State, 16 HUM. RTs L. J. 154 (1995); (Constitutional
Court of South Africa); Ruling 23/1990 (X.31) AB, Constitutional Court of Hungary, Judgment
of October 24, 1990, Magyar K6zl6ny (Official Gazette), Oct. 31, 1991.
11. Roger Hood, The Death Penalty (1996); William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the
Death Penalty in International Law (1997); Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects
(Peter Hodgkinson, Andrew Rutherford, eds., 1996). On the death penalty in the United States,
see: The Death Penalty in America, Current Controversies (Hugo Adam Bedau, ed., 1997).
12. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.),
Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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minority view that all of those convicted should also have been sentenced
to death. Those condemned to death were subsequently executed within a
few weeks, with the exception of G6ring, who committed suicide hours
before the time fixed for sentence." A series of successor trials were held
in Nuremberg pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10.14 Again, large
numbers were. sentenced to death or to various lesser punishments,
including life imprisonment or lengthy terms of detention. The sentencing
provisions of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal were similar to those
adopted at Nuremberg."s Of those convicted, seven were sentenced to
death and fifteen to life imprisonment. 6 The President of the Tokyo
Tribunal penned a separate opinion which seemed to favor sentences other
than death:
It may well be that the punishment of imprisonment for life
under sustained conditions of hardship in an isolated place
or places outside Japan - the usual conditions in such
cases - would be a greater deterrent to men like the
accused than the speedy termination of existence on the
scaffold or before a firing squad. 7
In response to arguments that these sentences breached the rule
nulla poena sine lege, it was said that "[i]ntemational law lays down that a
war criminal may be punished with death whatever crimes he may have
committed."'" The 1940 United States Army Manual Rules of Land
Warfare declared that "[a]ll war crimes are subject to the death penalty,
although a lesser penalty may be imposed." 9 A post-war Norwegian court
answered a defendant's plea that the death penalty did not apply to the
offense as charged by finding that violations of the laws and customs of
13. France et al. v. G6ring et al., (1946) 23 Trial of the major war criminals before the
international military Tribunal, 13 I.L.R. 203. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIALS, A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992); LES PROCtS DE NUREMBERG ET DE TOKYO
(Annette Wieviorka, ed., 1996).
14. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945, Official Gazette Control Council for
Germany, 50-55.
15. Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, 4
BEVANS 20, as amended, 4 BEVANS 27 ("Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal").
16. R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA MAGBANUA, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 854-858
(1981).
17. Id.; See also B.V.A. R&LING, ANTONIO CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND,
1993.
18. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, XV LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, 200 (1949).
19. FIELD MANUAL 27-10, Oct. 1, 1940, para. 357.
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war were always punished by death under international law.20 In 1948, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations suggested that the drafting
committee of the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide might wish to provide that the crime of genocide be
subject to capital punishment.' This indicates the general acceptance of
capital punishment at the time. A group of three experts involved in
drafting the Genocide Convention, Donnadieu de Vabres, Pella, and
Lemkin, revived provisions from a 1937 treaty that never came into force
and that provided for capital punishment for serious international crimes.22
Even then, the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
rejected proposals that the death penalty be explicitly mentioned as an
exception to the right to life because this might pose an obstacle to the
growing abolitionist trend.2Y
Within a few years, international lawmakers were more
circumspect about the death penalty. A draft provision proposed by the
International Law Commission for its "Draft Code of Offenses Against
The Peace and Security of Mankind" avoided any categorical reference to
capital punishment: "The penalty for any offense defined in this Code
shall be determined by the tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the
individual accused, taking into account the gravity of the offense."24 A
general assembly committee subsequently recommended that the statute
contain only the most general of provisions dealing with sentencing and
suggested the phrase "the court shall impose such penalties as it may
determine." The General Assembly committee even stated that the statute
might exclude certain forms of punishment, such as the death penalty.2
The post-Nuremberg efforts by the International Law Commission
and the general assembly to establish an international court did not
progress as quickly as hoped.27 Ultimately, the international criminal court
project was shelved for thirty-five years. Following a 1989 request by the
20. Public Prosecutor v. Klinge, (1946) 13 I.L.R. 262 (Supreme Court, Norway).
21. "List of substantive items to be discussed in the remaining stages of the Committee's
session, Memorandum submitted by the Secretariat," U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/1 1 (1948).
22. "Establishment of a permanent international criminal court for the punishment of Acts
of Genocide," U.N. Doc. E/447, at 73-74, 82-83 (1948).
23. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.2 (1947), pp. 10-11.
24. Yearbook 1951, Vol. II, at 134 et seq., U.N. Doc. A/1858, §59.
25. "Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction," U.N. GAOR 7th
Sess., Supp. No. 11, A/2136 §110-111 (1952). See draft art. 32: "The Court shall impose upon
an accused, upon conviction, such penalty as the Court may determine, subject to any limitations
prescribed in the instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the Court."
26. Id. §111.
27. G.A. Res. 898 (IX), G.A. Res. 1187 (XII).
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general assembly, the International Law Commission (The Commission)
returned to the issue. In 1990, special rapporteur Doudou Thiam proposed
three different provisions of a sentencing provision, one which did not rule
out the death penalty, the other two expressly excluded the death penalty.
Thiam said "[it therefore seems appropriate to select penalties on which
there is the broadest agreement and whose underlying principle is generally
accepted by the international community."2 When the issue of sentencing
came before the Commission in 1991, special rapporteur Thiam then
proposed that the Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind set out specific penalties. This time, the death penalty was
formally proscribed and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment was
provided.29  A few members of the Commission argued that capital
punishment should not be abandoned.0 However, the vast majority felt it
would be unthinkable to retain the death penalty, given the international
trend in favor of its abolition.' Several members also expressed their
reservations about sentences of life imprisonment, which they said were
also a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment2 After lengthy
discussion in the Commission, special rapporteur Thiam produced two new
draft sentencing provisions. Both of these drafts allowed for sentences up
28. "Eighth report on the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur," U.N. Do. AICN.41430/ Add.1 §§101-
105 (1990). See also "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-
second session," U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.Aj1990/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/45/10 §§148-149 (1990).
29. U.N. Doe. AICN.414351 Add. 1, §29. For the discussion of this proposal by the
International Law Commission, see U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2207-2214, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/46/10, §§70-105.
30. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2211, §15; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §19; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2212, §28; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §55. Special rapporteur Thiam promised
that the Commission's report would state that "two or three of its members" had expressed
reservations about exclusion of the death penalty: U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §59. The report
eventually stated that "many members of the Commission" opposed the death penalty and
"[slome other members" supported the death penalty: U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add.1
(Part 2), A/46/10, §§85-85.
31. U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2207, §§23-24; U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2208, §2; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2208, §21; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2208, §30; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §5;
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §29; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2210, §25; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2210, §33; U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2210, §46; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §4;
U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §12; U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2213, §23; U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SR.2213, §33.
32. U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2208, §10 (Graefrath); U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SR.2208, §21
(Calero Rodriguez); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2209, §19 (Barboza); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2210,
§47 (Njenga); U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SR.2212, §4 (Solari Tudela). See also: U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1991/Add. 1 (Part 2), A/46/10, §88. The German Constitutional Court has
suggested that life imprisonment without possibility of parole constitutes cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment: [1977] 45 BVerfGE 187, 228 (as translated in KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 316 (1987).
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to life imprisonment (which was square bracketed), or for a term of fifteen
to thirty years not subject to commutation. The draft provided for
additional sanctions including community work, total or partial
confiscation of property and deprivation of some or all civil and political
rights.
In 1993, as attention shifted to a draft statute of the proposed
international criminal court, it was necessary to include a sentencing
provision in that instrument also.33  The draft statute adopted by the
Commission stated that a person convicted under the statute could be
sentenced up to life imprisonment, but capital punishment was not
included. These provisions were reworked in the 1994 draft, although the
substance was not changed significantly.3 The 1995 discussion confined
itself to reiterating the importance of having a residual sentencing
provision in the statute in order not to run afoul of the nulla poena sine
lege principle, and once again eliminated the death penalty. 3
During the August 1996, session of the Preparatory Committee on
the international criminal court, some states with a predominantly Moslem
population argued that if the statute was to be considered representative of
all legal systems, it should include the death penalty .16 When work on the
draft statute of the proposed international criminal court was being
discussed by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in October
1997, several states seized the opportunity to insist that capital punishment
be excluded from the instrument. These states included Poland, Haiti,
Paraguay, Ukraine, and Italy. Kuwait, on the other hand, urged its
retention." Retentionist States are likely to insist upon the issue when the
Preparatory Committee discusses penalties during its December 1997
session. The recent history of these debates would suggest that they have
no chance of succeeding. What is more likely is that their silence might
imply acquiescence, something that human rights tribunals might later
interpret as evidence of the emergence of a customary norm.
While the debate had been underway in the International Law
Commission and the Preparatory Committee, the Security Council also
33. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session," 3
May-23 July 1993, GAOR 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/48/10), §84.
34. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session," 3
May-23 July 1994, GAOR 49th sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/49/10), 123-125.
35. "Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh
session," U.N. GAOR 50th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/50/10), 183.
36. U.N. Doe. L/2805 (1996); see also U.N. Do. L/2806 (1996), U.N. Doc. L/2813
(1996).
37. U.N. Doe. GA/L/3044 (1997); U.N. Doe. GA/L/3046 (1997); U.N. Doe. GA/L/3047
(1997); U.N. Doe. GA1L/3048 (1997).
1998]
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addressed the issue of sentencing when it set up the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals
contain brief provisions dealing with sentencing. The provisions
essentially propose that sentences be limited to imprisonment (thereby
tacitly excluding the death penalty, as well as corporal punishment,
imprisonment with hard labor, and fines) and that they be established by
taking into account the general practice of the criminal courts in the
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, as the case may be. 8 The exclusion of the
death penalty by the International Tribunal is a particularly sore point with
Rwanda. In the Security Council, Rwanda claimed there would be a
fundamental injustice in exposing criminals tried by its domestic courts to
execution if those tried by the international tribunal would only be subject
to life imprisonment. 9 Rwanda's representative said:
[S]ince it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing
with suspects who devised, planned and organized the
genocide, these may escape capital punishment whereas
those who simply carried out their plans would be
subjected to the harshness of this sentence. . . . That
situation is not conducive to national reconciliation in
Rwanda. 40
But to counter this argument, the representative of New Zealand reminded
Rwanda that "[flor over three decades the United Nations has been trying
progressively to eliminate the death penalty. It would be entirely
38. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 25, supra
note 9; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 24, supra note 9. On the
ad hoc tribunals generally, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); VIRGINIA
MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); Dai Tribunali Penali Intrnazionali ad hoc a
una Corte Permanente (Flavia Lattanzi, Elena Sciso, eds., 1996); D. Shraga & R. Zacklin, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 360 (1994); Eric
David, Le tribunal international penal pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, 25 REV. BELGE DROIT INT'L. 565
(1992); M. Bergsmo, The Establishment of the International Tribunal on War Crimes, 14 HUM.
RTS. L. J. 371 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994); Karine Lescure, Le tribunal penal international
pour l'ex-Yougoslavie, 1994; Christopher Greenwood, The International Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, 69 International Affairs 641 (1993); Jules Deschenes, Toward International Criminal
Justice, 5 CRIM. L. F. 249 (1994); David Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401 (1994); M. Gordon, Justice on Trial: The Efficacy of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 1 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 217 (1995).
39. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 16.
40. Id.
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unacceptable, and a dreadful step backwards, to introduce it here. "' Since
domestic trials began in Rwanda in December 1996, more than one
hundred people have been sentenced to death. These sentences have not
yet been carried out.42  In fact, Rwanda has not imposed capital
punishment since 1982. In 1992, President Habyarimana systematically
commuted all outstanding death sentences. 43  According to the United
Nations Secretary-General, Rwanda is now considered a de facto
abolitionist state because it has not conducted executions for more than ten
years." Even the program of the Rwandese Patriotic Front calls for
abolition of the death penalty. Furthermore, in the 1993 Arusha peace
accords, which have constitutional force in Rwanda, the government
undertook to ratify the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at Abolition of the Death
Penalty although it has not yet formally taken this step.45 Recent legislation
adopted by Rwanda in order to expedite trials of genocide suspects
abolishes the death penalty for the vast majority of offenders, who would
otherwise be subject to capital punishment under the country's Code
pinal."
III. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
International organizations have played an important role in
promoting abolition of the death penalty, through resolutions, treaties, and
other initiatives. Foremost among them are the various organs of the
United Nations, notably the General Assembly, the Commission on Human
Rights, and European regional organizations such as the Council of Europe
and the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Union.
41. Id. at 5.
42. William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 8 CRIM. L. F. 523 (1997).
43. Arritg prisidentiel no 103/105, Mesure de grdce, J.O. 1992, p. 446, art. 1.
44. Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing the protection
of the rights of those facing the death penalty, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
E/1995/78 §36 (1995). See also: The Death Penalty, List of Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries (September, 1985), Al Index: ACT 50/06/95.
45. "Protocole d'Accord entre le Gouvernement de la R6publique Rwandaise et le Front
Patriotique Rwandais portant sur les questions diverses et dispositions finales sign6 A Arusha",
Aug. 3, 1993, Journal officiel, Year 32, no. 16, August 15, 1993, p. 1430, art. 15.
46. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS & MARTIN IMBLEAU, INTRODUCTION TO RWANDAN LAW 44,
59-60 (1997).
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A. United Nations
In 1994, at the forty-ninth session, a draft General Assembly
resolution called for a moratorium on the death penalty:' The resolution
originated from a newly-formed non-governmental organization, "Hands
Off Cain - the International League for Abolition of the Death Penalty
Before the Year 2000," which obtained the support of the Italian
Parliament for the draft resolution. A series of introductory paragraphs
referred to earlier General Assembly resolutions on the death penalty: the
1984 Safeguards, relevant provisions, in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 48 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10 the Statutes of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,5' and the draft
statute of the proposed International Criminal Court. 2 The first of three
dispositive paragraphs invited states that -still maintain the death penalty to
comply with their obligations under the International Covenant and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in particular to exclude
pregnant women and juveniles from execution. The second paragraph
invited states which had not abolished the death penalty to consider the
progressive restriction of the number of offenses for which the death
penalty may be imposed, and to exclude the insane from capital
punishment. The final paragraph "encourage[d] states which have not yet
abolished the death penalty to consider the opportunity of instituting a
moratorium on pending executions with a view to ensuring that the
principle that no state should dispose of the life of any human being be
affirmed in every part of the world by the year 2000."
Italy launched the campaign with a request addressed to the Office
of the Presidency of the General Assembly that the item capital punishment
be added to the agenda. Pakistan, speaking on behalf of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, argued that capital punishment was a highly
sensitive and complicated issue, and warranted further and thorough
consideration. Pakistan opposed modification of the agenda to include the
47. U.N. Doc. A/49/234 and Add. 1 and Add.2 (1994), later revised by U.N. Doc.
A/C.3149/L.32IRev. 1 (1994).
48. Supra note 1, art. 3.
49. Supra note 3, art. 6.
50. G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex (1989), art. 6, 37(a).
51. Supra note 9.
52. Supra note 34.
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item, adding that if the resolution were to be considered, it should be in the
Sixth Committee that deals with legal issues, not the Third Committee that
deals with human rights issues." The representative of Sudan described
capital punishment as "a divine right according to some religions, in
particular Islam. " Iran, Malaysia, and Egypt also opposed discussing the
draft resolution, while Uruguay, Malta, Cambodia, Austria, Burundi,
Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, France, Ukraine and Andorra urged that it be
included on the agenda of the Third Committee." The item capital
punishment was added to the agenda of the Third Committee not by
consensus, as many had hoped, but on a vote of the General Assembly,
with seventy States in favor, twenty-four opposed, and forty-two
abstentions.6
Italy eventually obtained forty-nine co-sponsors for the resolutionY.7
During debate in the Third Committee, Singapore took the initiative in
attacking the draft resolution. According to the Singapore representative,
it strongly opposed efforts by certain states to use the United Nations to
impose their own values and system of justice on other countries. He
added that it was evident, from the wording of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, that no universal consensus held capital
punishment to be contrary to international law. He also said that the
abolition of the death penalty did not necessarily contribute to the
advancement of human dignity. Rather, its retention served to preserve
and safeguard the interests of society, notably in the repression of drug
trafficking.- Other states opposing the resolution during the debate
included Malaysia, Jamaica, Bangladesh, China, Sudan, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Egypt, Iran, Japan, and Jordan.
Germany spoke on behalf of the European Union, of which it was
the President at the time, supporting the resolution and noting that capital
punishment was not applied by any of its members. The German
representative cited its lack of significant deterrent effect, and a preference
53. U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49/SR.6, §2.
54. U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49/SR.5, §13.
55. U.N. Doec. A/BUR/49/SR.5-6.
56. U.N. Doc. A/49/610, §2.
57. Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sao Tomt
and Principe, Slovak Republic, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, Vanuatu and
Venezuela.
58. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.33, §§23-27.
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of European States for rehabilitation rather than retribution as a goal of
punishment. The text did not create new standards, but did urge that while
looking ahead towards abolition, the status quo of persons currently on
death row should be preserved.59  Slovenia, Sweden, Italy, Ireland,
Nicaragua, New Zealand, Andorra, Malta, Portugal, Cambodia, and
Namibia took the floor to support the draft resolution.
At the conclusion of the debate in the Third Committee, the Chair
attempted to summarize the debates:
[T]he Committee had clearly been divided into two camps
those favoring the abolition of capital punishment and
those wishing to retain it. Arguments in favor of
abolishing the death penalty had been the following: States
could not impose the death penalty as a means of reducing
crime because there was no evidence that it had a deterrent
effect; the right to life was the most basic human right and,
consequently, States did not have the right to take the life
of any individual; the death penalty sometimes veiled a
desire for vengeance or provided an easy way of
eliminating political opponents; the death penalty, once
applied, could not be reversed in the event of judicial
error; and capital punishment was excluded from the
penalties used by international tribunals, including those
established to deal with the situations in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and should consequently become
less prevalent in national legislation.
Arguments in support of maintaining the death penalty had
been the following: certain legislative systems were based on
religious laws; it was not possible to impose the ethical
standards of a single culture on all countries; there was a need
to discourage extremely serious crimes, and, in some
countries, capital punishment was a constitutional or even a
religious obligation.
At the same time, all members had agreed on certain
fundamental points: the death penalty should be applied only
in exceptional circumstances and subject to strict
59. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.36, §§7-15.
[Vol. 4:535
Schabas
preconditions, and its scope of application should be
extremely limited.6
Singapore initially attempted to block the resolution by proposing a
no action motion. This attempt was rejected, sixty-five states voting in
favor to seventy-four against, with twenty abstentions. Singapore then
proposed an amendment that distorted the original purpose of the
resolution, by adding the following preambular paragraph: "Affirming the
sovereign right of states to determine the legal measures and penalties
which are appropriate in their societies to combat serious crimes
effectively. "61 In order to save the resolution, Italy modified its original
text by incorporating the Singapore amendment. At the same time, Italy
added a reference to the Charter of the United Nations and to international
law, aimed at making Singapore's reactionary appeal to state sovereignty
subject to some recognition of international norms.62 By a close vote,
seventy-one to sixty-five, with twenty-one abstentions, Singapore's
amendment was adopted.6 3 Those voting in favor of the amendment were
retentionist states, essentially from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.
However, such an amendment made the resulting text unacceptable to
many abolitionist states. It constituted a setback to efforts within the
United Nations system dating to the 1950s to consider capital punishment
60. Id. at §§74-76.
61. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/L.73.
62. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/L.74.
63. In favor: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, China, C6te d'Ivoire,
Cuba, Korea, Egypt, Eritrea, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Against: Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Moldova, Romania,
Russian Federation, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.
Abstaining: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Niger,
Togo, Ukraine.
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as an issue of international concern, and not merely a domestic matter. In
the vote on the entire resolution, Italy continued to support the resolution,
even with the Singapore amendment, but most of its co-sponsors deserted
the camp and abstained in the final vote (a total of seventy-four states
abstained). The remainder, essentially retentionist states, tended to divide:
thirty-six voted in favor and forty-four voted against."4
Capital punishment returned to the United Nations agenda at the
1996 session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, which considered a draft resolution entitled Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty.
The resolution is the latest in a series adopted by the body and by its
predecessor, the United Nations Committee on Crime Problems and
Control, dealing with the death penalty. 65 In 1984, the Committee drafted
the Safeguards Guaranteeing the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty
(Safeguards),,* a document which was inspired in large part by articles 6,
14, and 15 of the Civil Rights Covenant. However, it went further,
detailing the scope of the phrase most serious crimes and adding new
mothers and the insane to the categories of individuals upon whom the
death penalty could never be carried out. The Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held every five years, examined
the death penalty and endorsed the Safeguards, as did the Economic and
Social Council and the General Assembly. In 1988, the Safeguards were
64. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.61. In favor: Argentina, Armenia, Cambodia, Cape Verde,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia,
Greece, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.
Against: Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cameroon, China, Comoros, Egypt, Guinea, Guyana, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives,
Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates,
United States of America, and Yemen.
Abstaining: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, C6te d'lvoire,
Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany,
Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Micronesia,
Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri
Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
65. Roger S. Clark, The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program,
Formulation of Standards and Efforts at Their Implementation 1994, 58-62.
66. E.S.C. Res. 1984/50. Subsequently endorsed by G.A. Res. A/39/118.
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themselves strengthened by a new resolution of the Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control, which addressed additional matters, such as the
prohibition of execution of the mentally handicapped.67
The 1996 resolution calls upon Member States in which the death
penalty has not been abolished to effectively apply the safeguards
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty.
This will ensure that each defendant facing a possible death penalty is
given all guarantees to ensure a fair trial, that defendants who do not
sufficiently understand the language used in court are fully informed by
way of interpretation or translation of all the charges against them and the
content of the relevant evidence deliberated in court, to allow adequate
time for the preparation of appeals; for the completion of appeals
proceedings as well as for petitions for clemency, to ensure that officials
involved in decisions to carry out an execution are fully informed of the
status of appeals, for petitions for clemency of the prisoner in question,
and to effectively apply the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners," in order to keep to a minimum the suffering of prisoners under
sentence of death and to avoid any exacerbation of such suffering. The
resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social
Council.69
Italy recovered from the frustration of the 1994 General Assembly,
and presented a resolution to the 1997 session of the Commission on
Human Rights calling, inter alia, for a moratorium on the death penalty. 0
The preamble refers to the right to life provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,'7 1 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights2 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child," as well as
relevant resolutions of the General Assembly 4 and the Economic and
Social Council.71 It notes deep concern that several countries impose the
67. E.S.C. Res. 1989/64.
68. E.S.C. Res. 663C(XXIV); as amended, E.S.C. Res. 2076(LXII), §§56-59. On the
Standard Minimnm Rules, see: ROGER S. CLARK, supra note 66 at 145-179
69. E.S.C. Res. 1996/15, July 23, 1996.
70. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/L.20 (1997).
71. Supra note 1, art. 3.
72. Supra note 3, art. 6.
73. G.A. Res. A/44/25, Annex (1989), art. 6, 37(a).
74. G.A. Res. A/26/2857 (XXVI) (1971); G.A. Res. A/32/61 (1977); G.A. Res.
A/44/128 (1989).
75. E.S.C. Res. 1574 (L) (1971); E.S.C. Res. 1745 (LIV) (1973); E.S.C. Res. 1930
(LVIII) (1975); E.S.C. Res. 1984/50; E.S.C. Res. 1985/33; E.S.C. Res. 1989/64; E.S.C. Res.
1990/29; E.S.C. Res. 1990/51; E.S.C. Res. 1996/15.
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death penalty in disregard of the limitations provided for in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, as well as the Safeguards guaranteeing protection
of the rights of those facing the death penalty.7 6 The resolution states the
Commission's conviction "that abolition of the death penalty contributes to
the enhancement of human dignity and to the progressive development of
human rights.""
In its operative paragraphs, it calls for accession or ratification of
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty. States that
still maintain the death penalty are urged to comply fully with their
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Notably, the obligations
not to impose the death penalty for any but the most serious crimes, not to
impose it for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age, to
exclude pregnant women from capital punishment and to ensure the right to
seek pardon or commutation of sentence. It requests states to consider
suspending executions and impose a moratorium on the death penalty.
There was fierce debate within the Commission as a handful of
retentionist states struggled to resist this new initiative. The Philippines,
with the support of Malaysia and Egypt, attempted to subvert the resolution
by a number of amendments that, in effect, undermined its meaning.7 8
Denmark noted that the United Nations Security Council, in the statutes
governing the Tribunals for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, did not provide for the death penalty. Canada, although not a co-
sponsor of the resolution, commended Italy's leadership and announced it
would vote in favor of the resolution. Speaking before the Commission on
behalf of the non-governmental organization that originally promoted the
revolution, I noted that thirty states ratified the Second Optional Protocol,
and that international justice no longer tolerated capital punishment, even
for those responsible for genocide and war crimes. I expressed deep
concern about the number of executions taking place in many parts of the
world, particularly in countries such as Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, China,
and the United States, and urged all States that maintained the death
penalty not to apply it to pregnant women, juveniles or the insane.7 9
Several opponents charged that the Italian draft was unbalanced, including
China, Egypt, India, and the United States. India and Malaysia argued
76. E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, Annex.
77. Id.
78. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/L.35 (1997).
79. U.N. Doe. HR/CN/770 (1997).
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that it was improper to present a resolution before the Commission that had
already been rejected by the General Assembly. Others who spoke against
the resolution were Japan, Republic of Korea, and Bangladesh.w The
resolution was passed by a roll-call vote of twenty-seven in favor and
eleven opposed, with fourteen abstaining.8 '
According to Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, in a recent
interview:
We have to let some time pass, so that the abolitionist
victory in Geneva can sink in, and produce results.
Raising this issue prematurely with the General Assembly
could compromise our efforts. This is why Italy, and
other "like-minded" countries, prefer to avoid a
confrontation with the General Assembly, and wait until
the moment is right. We shall continue to closely monitor
the situation, however, to avoid draft resolutions being
presented by retentionist states.82
The terms of the 1997 resolution require that the matter return to the
Commission agenda in 1998. No death penalty resolution was presented to
the General Assembly during its 1997 session.
The Commission on Human Rights has not designated a special
rapporteur with specific responsibility for capital punishment. However,
its special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Senegalese lawyer Waly Bacre Ndaye, has taken a considerable interest in
the subject and clearly views it as part of his mandate. In his 1997 annual
report to the Commission on Human Rights, Ndaye reiterated his views on
the desirability of abolishing the death penalty. He stated that "given that
the loss of life is irreparable . .. the abolition of capital punishment is
most desirable in order fully to respect the right to life." He added that
80. U.N. Doc. HR/CN/788 (1997).
81. U.N. Doc. HRICN/789 (1997). The resolution is recorded as 1997/12. In favor:
Angola, Argentina, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Mozambique,
Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay. Against:
Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Republic of
Korea, United States. Abstaining: Benin, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, India,
Madagascar, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.
82. Alessandra Filograno, Italy's Greatest Triumph, Hands Off Cain, Review Against the
Death Penalty No. 3, October/December 1997, at 35-37.
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"where there is a fundamental right to life, there is no right to capital
punishment. ""
In his report, Ndaye noted such positive developments as the
abolition of the death penalty by Belgium during July 1996. He expressed
concern about expansion of the scope of the death penalty in Estonia and
Libya, and regretted the fact that some states resumed executions after a
lull of many years, notably Bahrain, Comoros, Guatemala, Thailand and
Zimbabwe. The special rapporteur referred to the importance of
maintaining the highest procedural standards in capital trials, including
public hearings. He said he was disturbed by reports that the death penalty
was imposed in secrecy in some countries, such as Blears, China,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Ndaye noted that:
[A]s in previous years, the Special Rapporteur received
numerous reports indicating that in some cases the practice
of capital punishment in the United States does not
conform to a number of safeguards and guarantees
contained in international instruments relating to the rights
of those facing the death penalty. The imposition of the
death penalty on mentally retarded persons, the lack of
adequate defense, the absence of obligatory appeals and
racial bias continue to be the main concerns.'
In his report, he said he:
[R]emains deeply concerned that death sentences continue
to be handed down after trials which allegedly fall short of
the international guarantees for a fair trial, including lack
of adequate defense during the trials and appeals
procedures. An issue of special concern to the Special
Rapporteur remains the imposition and application of the
death penalty on persons reported to be mentally retarded
or mentally ill. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur
continues to be concerned about those cases which were
allegedly tainted by racial bias on the part of the judges or
prosecution and about the non-mandatory nature of the
83. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996). See also Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. EICN.411996/614, §§507-517, §§540-557.
84. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60 (1996), §543.
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appeals procedure after conviction in capital cases in some
states."
In the course of 1996, the Special Rapporteur sent urgent appeals
to the United States of America concerning death sentences imposed on the
mentally retarded; in cases following trial in which the right to an adequate
defense had allegedly not been fully ensured; where individuals had been
sentenced to death without resorting to their right to lodge any legal or
clemency appeal; and where they had been sentenced to death despite
strong indications casting doubt on their guilt.16 Ndaye sent a special
appeal to the United States in the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell, who,
according to his report to the Commission on Human Rights, "has
reportedly extraordinary proof of innocence which could not be considered
because the law of the State of Virginia does not allow new evidence into
court twenty-one days after conviction."" Despite an international
campaign, O'Dell was executed in July 1997. Ndaye also noted that in
response to his urgent appeals, the Government of the United States
provided nothing more than a reply in the form of a description of the legal
safeguards provided to defendants in the United States in criminal cases."
Ndaye had inquired on several occasion as to whether the United
States would "consider extending him an invitation to carry out an on-site
visit."89 As a result of repeated initiatives, on October 17, 1996, he
received a written invitation from the government to visit the United States
and conduct his investigation.9 In October 1997, Special Rapporteur
Ndaye conducted a two-week mission to the United States, where he
attempted to visit death row prisoners in Florida, Texas, and California.
At California's San Quentin Penitentiary, he was refused permission by
authorities to meet with designated prisoners. Ndaye's visit provoked the
ire of Senator Jesse Helms, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, who in a letter to William Richardson, United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, described the mission as
an "an absurd U.N. charade."91 Helms asked, "Bill, is this man confusing
the United States with some other country or is this an intentional insult to
85. Id. §551.
86. Id. §544.
87. Id.
88. Id. §546.
89. Id. §§547, 548.
90. Id. §549.
91. John M. Goshko, Helms Calls Death Row Probe "Absurd U.N. Charade," THE
WASHINGTON POST, October 8, 1997; at A07.
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the United States and to our nation's legal system?" 9 Ndaye replied: "I am
very surprised that a country that is usually so open and has been helpful to
me on other missions, such as my attempts to investigate human rights
abuses in the Congo, should consider my visit an insult." 91
B. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe, now composed of forty member states
covering virtually all of the European continent as well as much of
northern Asia, was the first regional system to incorporate a fully
abolitionist international norm when, in 1983, it adopted Protocol No. 6 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty Protocol.9 4 The
Protocol is an optional instrument, allowing states that are parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights" to extend their obligations and to
bind themselves as a question of international law to the prohibition of
capital punishment. The Protocol, although not without its shortcomings,
represents a seminal development in the abolition of the death penalty,
setting an example that goes well beyond its own borders. It provided a
model to drafters in the United Nations and the Organization of American
States, who followed Europe's example several years later.
In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
adopted a resolution calling upon member states that had not yet done so to
ratify the Protocol. The resolution praised Greece, which in 1993 had
abolished the death penalty for crimes committed in wartime as well as in
peacetime. It stated:
In view of the irrefutable arguments against the imposition
of capital punishment, it calls on the parliaments of all
member states of the Council of Europe, and of all states
whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status at
the Assembly, which retain capital punishment for crimes
committed in peacetime and/or in wartime, to strike it
from their statute books completely.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. PROTOCOL No. 6, supra note 6.
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. no. 5, entered into force Sep. 3, 1953.
96. Resolution 1044 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, October 4, 1994 (25th
sitting). See also C. of E. P.A. Doc. 7154.
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It urged all heads of state and all parliaments in whose countries death
sentences are passed to grant clemency to the convicted. It also affirmed
that willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6 be made a prerequisite for
membership of the Council of Europe. Significantly, in the Dayton Peace
Agreement, signed at Paris on December 14, 1995, the new state of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is held to the highest standard of compliance with
contemporary human rights norms, including ratification of the Protocol
and the incorporation of its terms as the fundamental law of the new
republic.w The irony is that the agreement was negotiated in Ohio, a state
that still retains the death penalty.
The Parliamentary Assembly (Assembly) also adopted a
recommendation that deplored the fact that the death penalty was still
provided by law in eleven Council of Europe member states and seven
states whose legislative assemblies have special status with respect to the
organization." An indication that the death penalty is far from a theoretical
issue in Europe, it expressed shock that fifty-nine people were legally put
to death in those states in 1993, and that at least 575 prisoners were known
currently to be awaiting their execution. The Assembly said that
application of the death penalty may well be compared with torture and be
seen as inhuman and degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 3
of the European Convention on Human Rights. It recommended that the
Committee of Ministers draft an additional protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights, abolishing the death penalty both in peace
and wartime, and obliging the parties not to re-introduce it under any
circumstances. The recommendation also proposed establishing a control
mechanism that would oblige states where the death penalty is still
provided by law to set up a commission with a view to abolishing capital
punishment. A moratorium would be declared on all executions while the
commissions fulfill their tasks. The commissions would be required to
notify the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of any death
sentences passed and any executions scheduled without delay. Any
country that had scheduled an execution would be required to halt it for a
period of six months from the time of notification of the Secretary General.
During this time the Secretary General would be empowered to send a
delegation to conduct an investigation and make a recommendation to the
country concerned. Finally, all states would be bound not to allow the
97. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4:
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. II§2, Annex I, §7; General Framework Agreement
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights, art. 1.
98. Recommendation 1246 (1994) on the abolition of capital punishment, October 4, 1994
(25th sitting).
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extradition of any person to a country in which he or she risked being
sentenced to death and subjected to the extreme conditions on death row.
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in a
January 1996, interim reply, indicated that the proposals of the Assembly
were being examined. The Assembly adopted a new recommendation, on
June 28, 1996, calling for the Committee of Ministers to follow up on the
1994 proposals without delay."9 On June 28, 1996, the Assembly adopted
a resolution reaffirming its opposition to the death penalty. The Assembly
declared that all states joining the Council of Europe must impose a
moratorium on executions, without delay, and indicate their willingness to
ratify The Protocol. The resolution added:
[T]he Assembly reminds applicant states to the Council of
Europe that the willingness to sign and ratify Protocol No.
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and to
introduce a moratorium upon accession has become a
prerequisite for membership of the Council of Europe on
the part of the Assembly .... 10
Resolution 1097 (Resolution) was also an answer to reports that the
Russian Federation and Ukraine, which had recently joined the Council of
Europe, were not honoring their commitments. The Resolution
condemned Ukraine for apparently violating its commitments to introduce
a moratorium on executions of the death penalty upon its accession to the
Council of Europe. As for Russia, the Assembly demanded that it respect
its undertakings to stop all executions. The Resolution stated that further
executions could imperil the continued membership of the two states in the
Council of Europe. The Assembly extended its warning to Latvia, where
apparently two executions have been carried out since it joined the Council
of Europe. Amnesty International has reported that in 1996, Ukraine
carried out 167 executions and Russia carried out 140 executions. This put
the two states at the top of the list for executions world-wide, with the
exception of China, whose title to first place in the standings has been
undisputed for many years.'0 ' In order to advance the debate within
Ukraine, the Assembly of the Council of Europe held a seminar on the
abolition of the death penalty in Kiev, November 28-29, 1996, at which
99. Recommendation 1302 (1996).
100. Resolution 1097 (1996).
101. The Death Penalty Worldwide: Developments in 1996, Amnesty International, June
1997, Al Index: ACT 50/05/97.
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international experts debated the issues with members of the Ukrainian
judicial community. °0
Russia and the Ukraine have now signed the Protocol, on April 17,
1997 and May 5, 1997 respectively. These states must still ratify the
instrument, although pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed
the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until
it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty .... 103
It appears that both the Russian Federation and the Ukraine have, in effect,
respected the moratorium and that executions in those countries have
stopped.10 If they stay the course, it will be a compelling argument in
support of those who argued that it was preferable for the Council to admit
Russia and Ukraine as members despite their initial failure to meet the
basic conditions of the organization, the Council would be in a better
position to influence them to conform to its fundamental norms.
On October 11, 1997, at the Second Summit of the Council of
Europe, the Heads of State or Government of the Council of Europe
adopted a series of declarations, including one dealing with capital
punishment. In their declarations to the Summit, several of the leaders
insisted upon the importance of abolition of the death penalty as one of the
central human rights goals of the Council, including Romano Prodi of
Italy, Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, Alfred Sant of Malta and Poul
Nyrup Rasmussen of Denmark. Russian President Boris Yeltsin
announced: "Russia has introduced a moratorium on capital punishment
and we are strictly complying with this undertaking. I know that the
European public opinion was shocked by public executions in Chechnya.
Russia's leadership is taking all necessary measures to contain such
manifestations of medieval barbarity."' °  The President of Latvia, Guntis
Ulmanis, explained that a year earlier he had imposed a moratorium on
102. C. of E. Doc. AS/Jur (1996) 70-72.
103. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18a, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
104. The Committee Against Torture recently urged Ukraine to make its moratorium on the
death penalty permanent: U.N. Doc. HR/4326.
105. C. of E. Doc. SUM(97)PV1 prov., at 65.
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executions and that it is still in force. °0 In the final Declaration of the
Summit, the heads of state and government call for the universal abolition
of the death penalty and insist on the maintenance, in the meantime, of
existing moratoria on executions in Europe.
C. European Union
Death penalty issues have frequently been raised within the
European Parliament, which has generated a number of resolutions over
the years. A resolution in 1981 called for abolition of the death penalty in
the European Community.1°" Following the coming into force of the
Protocol, the European Parliament called upon member states to ratify that
abolitionist instrument.'0 In 1989, the European Parliament adopted The
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which proclaims the
abolition of the death penalty.1° In 1990, the President of the European
Parliament announced that he had forwarded a motion for a resolution on
abolition of the death penalty in the United States.110 Subsequently, the
Political Affairs Committee decided to prepare a report on the death
penalty and appointed Maria Adelaide Aglietta as rapporteur. In 1992, a
motion for a resolution was prepared that named those European Union
states whose legislation still provided for the death penalty in the case of
exceptional crimes, namely Greece, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, to abolish it altogether. It also urged all member states that had
not yet done so to ratify the Protocol as well as the Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
resolution also called upon member states to refuse extradition to states
where capital punishment still exists, unless sufficient guarantees that it
will not be provided were obtained. The resolution also stated that the
European Parliament:
106. Id. at 28.
107. E.C. Doc. 1-20/80, March 13, 1980; E.C. Do. 1-65/81; Official Journal of the
European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, No. 1-272, Annex, pp. 116-129;
the Irish extremist Ian Paisley spoke against the proposal, as did some Greek members. The
Report was adopted on June 18, 1981: Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of
the European Parliament, No. 1-272, Annex, pp. 225-228; E.C. Doc. A 2-167/85, Doe. B 2-
220/85; Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, No.
2-334, Annex, pp. 300-303.
108. E.C. Doe. A2-0187/85; Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the
European Parliament, C 36, February 17, 1986, at 214.
109. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament,
Annex, No. 2-377, pp. 56-58, 74-79, 151-155; E.C. Doe. A 2-3/89.
110. E.C. Do. B3-0605/89. See also E.C. Doe. B3-0682/90; E.C. Doe. B3-1915/90.
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[H]opes that those countries which are members of the
Council of Europe, and have not done so, will undertake to
abolish the death penalty (in the case of exceptional
crimes, this applies to Cyprus, Malta, and Switzerland,
and in the case of both ordinary and exceptional crimes, to
Turkey and Poland), together with those countries which
are members of the C.S.C.E., in which the death penalty
still exists (Bulgaria, United States of America,
Commonwealth of Independent States, Yugoslavia,
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Albania).1"
It urged the United Nations to adopt a "binding decision imposing a
general moratorium on the death penalty. ""2 Death penalty practice has
also been a factor in assessing human rights within states whose
recognition is being considered by the European Union. In its opinion on
recognition of Slovenia, the Arbitration Commission presided by French
Judge Robert Badinter took note of the abolition of the death penalty in the
Constitution of Slovenia."3
In October 1997, the European Union adopted the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which amends the various conventions concerning the body
and its components. The instrument is completed with a series of
declarations, the first of which concerns the death penalty. It states:
With reference to Article F(2) of the Treaty on European
Union, the Conference recalls that Protocol No. 6 to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4
November 1950, and which has been signed and ratified by
a large majority of Member States, provides for the
abolition of the death penalty. In this context, the
Conference notes the fact that since the signature of the
abovementioned Protocol on 28 April 1983, the death
penalty has been abolished in most of the Member States of
the Union and has not been applied in any of them."4
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Conference on Yugoslavia, opinion No. 7, on International Recognition of the
Republic of Slovenia by the European Community and its Member States, Jan. 11, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1512, 1516 (1992).
114. Treaty of Ansterdam (visited February 21, 1998)
http://ve.ev.int/Amsterdam/en/amstera/en.htm7.
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IV. EXTRADITION
Extradition has become an important indirect way in which
international law promotes the death penalty. Since the late nineteenth
century, extradition treaties have contained clauses by which states parties
may refuse extradition for capital offenses in the requesting state unless a
satisfactory assurance will be given that the death penalty will not be
imposed. Such provisions can be found as early as 1889, in the South
American Convention, in the 1892 extradition treaty between the United
Kingdom and Portugal, in the 1908 extradition treaty between the United
States and Portugal, and in the 1912 treaty prepared by the International
Commission of Jurists.", These clauses have now become a form of
international law boilerplate and are contained in model extradition treaties
adopted within international organizations including the United Nations.1 16
Several important cases have been heard by courts in Europe and Canada
concerning extradition to the United States. Extradition to the United
States from Europe is now virtually contingent on such assurances, the
result of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, while in
Canada the position is not nearly as clear.
The European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) first
addressed the question of extradition to the death rows on the other side of
the Atlantic in Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, a case originating in
California. The United Kingdom was empowered to refuse Soering's
extradition to the United States because of a provision in the extradition
treaty between the two countries. This provision entitles either contracting
party to insist upon an undertaking from the other that the death penalty
would not be imposed. The text is drawn from Article 11 of the European
Convention on Extradition. Although the death penalty is ostensibly
115. P. Leboucq, Influence en matire d'extradition de la peine applicable dans le pays
requgrant, (1911) J.D.I. 437; J.S. Reeves, Extradition Treaties and the Death Penalty, 18 AM.
J. INT'L L. 298 (1924); American Institute of International Law, Project No. 17, 20 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 331 (1926); Harvard Law School Draft Extradition Treaty, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
21, 228 (1935); GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 99-100 (1991); Sharon A.
Williams, Extradition to a State that Imposes the Death Penalty, 28 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117
(1990); Sharon A. Williams, Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence
as Bases for Refusing Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 259 (1991); Sharon A. Williams,
Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3
CRIM. L.F. 191 (1992).
116. Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.14/28/Rev.1, p. 68 (1990), art. 4;
Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, art. 9, 20 I.L.M. 723 (1981);
European Convention on Extradition, (1960) 359 U.N.T.S. 273, E.T.S. 24, art. 11. The Italian
Constitutional Court has ruled that article 11 of the European Convention on Extradition does not
codify a customary rule of international law: Re Cuillier, Ciamborrani and Vallon, (1988) 78
I.L.R. 93 (Constitutional Court, Italy).
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permitted by article 2, section 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which subjects the right to life to limitations, the Commission
considered that it might raise issues under article 3, which is the
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. Kirkwood's application
was declared inadmissible, not because the argument itself was flawed but
because he had failed to demonstrate that detention on death row was
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of article 3.117
Implicitly, the Commission recognized that the European Convention on
Human Rights might intervene to prevent extradition from a state party.
The issue returned to the Strasbourg organs several years later in the
case of Jens Soering, who had been arrested in the United Kingdom under an
extradition warrant issued at the request of the United States!18  In a
judgment issued on July 7, 1989,119 the European Court of Human Rights
confirmed that circumstances relating to a death sentence could give rise to
issues respecting the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment. It addressed four of them: length of detention prior to
execution; conditions on death row; age and mental state of the applicant;
and the competing extradition request from Germany.
The Court noted that a condemned prisoner could expect to spend
six to eight years on death row before being executed. The Court agreed
that this was "largely of the prisoner's own making," in that it was the
117. Kirkwood v. United Kingdom (App. No. 10308/83), (1985) 37 D.R. 158, at 184.
118. C. Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: the Adjudicative
Background to the Soering case, 11 Mich. J Int'l L. 1073, (1989-90); Vincent Berger,
Jurisprudence de la Cour europ~enne des droits de 'homme 12-13 (1994).
119. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 EUR. CT. H.R. (ser.A) (1989). For scholarly
comment on the Soering case, see: W. Ganshof VAN DER MEERSCH, L'extradition et la
Convention europienne des droits de l'homme. L'affaire Soering, 1990 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 5; Fr&I6ric Sudre, Extradition et peine de mort - arrit Soering de la
Cour europienne des droits de I'homme du 7juillet 1989, 1990 REVUE GINIRALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 103; Michael O'BOYLE, Extradition and Expulsion under the European
Convention on Human Rights, Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSH 93 (James O'REILLY, ed., 1994);
Ann Sherlock, Extradition, Death Row and the Convention, 15 EUR. L. REV. 87 (1990); David
L. Gappa, European Court of Human Rights - Extradition - Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Soering Case, 161 Eur.Ct.H.R. (Ser.A) 1989), 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463
(1990); H. Wattendorff, E. du Perron, Human Rights v. Extradition: the Soering case, 11 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 845 (1990); J. Quigley, J. Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is it
Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. INT'L L.J. 251 (1989); Christine van den Wyngaert,
Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?,
39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757 (1990); Susan Marks, Yes, Virginia, Extradition May Breach the
European Convention on Human Rights, 49 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 194 (1990); Henri Labayle, Droits
de l'homme, traitement inhumain et peine capitale: Rflexions sur l 'dification d'n ordre public
europien en matire d'extradition par la Cour europienne des droits de l'homme, 64 SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 3452 (1990); L.E. Pettiti, Arrit Soering c./Grande-Bretagne du 8juillet 1989, 1989
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PtNAL COMPARI 786.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
result of systematic appellate review and various collateral attacks by
means of habeas corpus. The Court said:
Nevertheless, just as some lapse of time between sentence
and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards are to be
provided to the condemned person, so it is equally part of
human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting
those safeguards to the full. However, well-intentioned
and even potentially beneficial is the provision of the
complex of post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the
consequence is that the condemned prisoner has to endure
for many years the conditions on death row and the
anguish and mounting tension of living in the ever-present
shadow of death.1' °
The Court took note of the exceptionally severe regime in effect on death
row, adding that it was "compounded by the fact of inmates being subject
to it for a protracted period lasting on average six to eight years."21 What
the Court had described is often labeled the death row phenomenon. ' As
120. Id. §106.
121. Id. §107.
122. The issue of the death row phenomenon has been litigated before many domestic
courts. For case law on the subject, see: Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 582,
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465; Rajendra Prasad v. State of Utter Pradesh, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 78, A.I.R.
1979 S.C. 915; Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960); Arsenault v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 575, 233 N.E.2d 730 rev'd, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35, 21 L. Ed. 2d
5 (1968); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (1972),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 2060, 32 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1972); Andrews v. Shulsen, 600
F. Supp. 408, 431 (D.Utah 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
919, 108 S. Ct. 1091, 99 L. Ed. 2d 253, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1015, 108 S. Ct. 1491, 99 L.
Ed. 2d 718 (1988); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 131 L. Ed. 2d 304
(1995); et al. v. Carter N.O. et al, [1968] 1 R.L.R. 136 (A.), 1968 (2) S.A. 445; Catholic
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Zimbabwe, et al., [1993] 4
S.A. 239 (Z.S.C.), [1993] 1 Z.L.R. 242 (S), 14 H.R.L.J. 323; Abbott v. A.-G. of Trinidad and
Tobago, [19791 1 W.L.R. 1342, 32 W.I.R. 347 (J.C.P.C.); Riley v. Attorney-General of
Jamaica, [1983] 1 A.C. 719, 3 All. E.R. 469, 35 W.I.R. 279 (J.C.P.C.); Pratt et al. v. Attorney
General for Jamaica et al., [1993] 4 AII.E.R. 769, [1993] 2 L.R.C. 349, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, [1993]
3 W.L.R. 995, 43 W.I.R. 340, 14 H.R.L.J. 338, 33 I.L.M. 364 (J.C.P.C.). On the death row
phenomenon in general, see: STEPHEN M. GETIINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEOPLE, THE
CRIMES AND THE CONTROVERSY (1979); BRUCE JACKSON, DIANE CHRISTIAN, DEATH ROW
(1980); J. Alexis, M. De Merieux, Inordinately delayed hanging: Whether an inhuman
punishment, 29 J. INDIAN L. INSTITUTE 356 (1987); Lloyd Vogelman, The Living Dead: Living
on Death Row, 5 SOUTH AFRICAN J. HUM. RTs 183 (1989); J.L. Gallemore Jr., J.H. Panton,
Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 AMERICAN J. PSYCHIATRY 167
(1972); Nancy Holland, Death Row Conditions: Progression Toward Constitutional Protections,
2 AKRON L. REV. 293 (1985); ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE, LIFE UNDER SENTENCE
OF DEATH (1981); HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING (1993); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE
DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE 96-156 (1996).
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a result of the Court's decision, the United Kingdom sought and obtained
more thorough assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed, as
was noted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on
March 12, 1990.123 Soering was subsequently extradited, tried, and
sentenced to life imprisonment.'2 '
Although the Court has not revisited the question since Soering,
the European Commission on Human Rights has been called upon to
interpret the Soeing judgment. In January 1994, it ruled an application
from an individual subject to extradition to the United States for a capital
offense to be inadmissible. The Commission considered the guarantees
that had been provided by the Dallas County prosecutor to the French
Government, to the effect that if extradition were granted, "the State of
Texas (would) not seek the death penalty," to be sufficient. Texas law
stated that the death penalty could only be pronounced if requested by the
prosecution. The fugitive had claimed that the undertaking was "vague
and imprecise." Furthermore, she argued that it had been furnished by the
federal authorities through diplomatic channels and did not bind the
executive or judicial authorities of the State of Texas. The Commission
compared the facts with those in Soering, where the prosecutor had made
clear an intention to seek the death penalty.'2' The Commission found the
Texas prosecutor's attitude to be fundamentally different and concurred
with an earlier decision of the French Conseil d'Itat holding the
undertaking to be satisfactory.1'2
In Cinar v. Turkey, the applicant was sentenced to death in 1984,
and the judgment was upheld on appeal in 1987. In 1991, the applicant
was released on parole, pursuant to legislation that also declared that all
death sentences were to be commuted. The Commission recalled that
Article 3 of the Convention could not be interpreted as prohibiting the
death penalty. Moreover, it held that a certain period of time between
pronouncement of the sentence and its execution was inevitable. The
Commission added that Article 3 would only be breached where an
individual passed a very long time on death row, under extreme conditions,
with the constant anxiety of execution. Thus, the Commission adopted a
large view of Soering by not insisting upon the various extenuating factors,
such as young age and mental instability, which had been referred to by the
123. Council of Europe, Information Sheet No. 26, Strasbourg, 1990, 116.
124. Richard B. Lillich, The Soering case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991).
125. Aylor-Davis v. France (No. 22742/93), (1994) 76B D.R. 164.
126. Dame Joy Davis-Aylor, C.E., req. no 144590, 15/10/93, D. 1993, IR, 238; J.C.P.
1993, Actualit6s No. 43, [1993] Revue franfaise de droit administratif 1166, conclusions C.
Vigoreux.
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Court.' 2 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that in Turkey during
the period (inar was on death row, there was not actually any serious
danger of his death sentence being carried out. Referring to the Court's
judgment in Soering, which observed that the death penalty no longer
existed in the states parties to the Convention, the Commission described
the threat of execution as "illusory. "12s
The Commission implied, in a decision issued in September 1994,
that it might be prepared to go further and find the death penalty itself to
be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. That case involved an alleged
deserter from the Syrian army, who was contesting his expulsion from
Sweden. The Commission concluded that it was far more likely the
applicant was a draft evader, a crime for which capital punishment did not
apply. It stated: "Concerning his possible imprisonment for that offense,
the Commission does not find such a penalty so severe as to raise an issue
under Article 3 of the Convention even considering the general situation in
Syrian prisons."129 Interestingly, the Commission did not cite Soering, or
state that in any case, expulsion to a country where the death penalty
would be imposed would not per se violate the Convention, which
authorized capital punishment in Article 2. Was the Commission
suggesting it may be prepared to find extradition to a state where the death
penalty might be imposed, irrespective of whether it would be associated
with the death row phenomenon, to be contrary to Article 3 of the
Convention?
Still more recently, the Commission considered the case of Lei
Ch'an Wa, who was threatened with extradition from Macao to China for
trafficking in narcotics, which is a capital crime. The representative of the
Chinese news agency Xinhua, which unofficially represented China's
interests in Macao, had stated that the death penalty would not be imposed
in the event of extradition. This was allowed by the Portuguese extradition
legislation in force in Macao. Portugal's Constitution says that extradition
is forbidden for crimes for which the death penalty is provided in the
receiving state's legislation. Extradition was forbidden by the Constitution
despite the existence of an assurance from the representative of China.
The Constitutional Court held that under the circumstances extradition was
prohibited. In the meantime, Lei had registered an application with the
European Commission, which issued provisional measures pursuant to
Article 36 of its Regulations. However, once the Constitutional Court had
settled the matter, the problem was resolved, and the Commission decided
127. inar v. Turkey (App. No. 17864/91), (1994) 79A D.R. 5, at pp. 8-9.
128. Id. at 9.
129. (App. No. 22408/93), (1994) 79A D.R. 85, at p. 96.
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that it was unnecessary to further examine the application. 130  In another
case, involving extradition from Austria to the Russian Federation to stand
trial for murder, the Commission noted a maximum sentence of ten years
in the Penal Code of the Russian Federation. The commission also noted
the fact that the two accomplices had been sentenced to nine years,
concluding that "there are no substantial grounds for believing that the
applicant faces a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty in the
Russian Federation." 1 31
The Protocol has also been cited in domestic law in cases
concerning extradition of fugitives to states imposing the death penalty.
On two occasions, the French Conseil d'ttat has refused to extradite,
expressing the view that the Protocol establishes a European ordre public
that prohibits extradition in capital cases.1 2 The Supreme Court of the
Netherlands took a similar view. The court invoked the Protocol in
refusing to return a United States serviceman,", although required to do so
by the N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement. ' ' The Court also considered
the European Convention and the Protocol took precedence over the other
treaty.
In 1996, Italy's Constitutional Court took judicial opposition to
extradition for capital crimes one step further when it refused to send
Pietro Venezia to the United States. The court refused despite assurances
from American prosecutors that the death penalty would not be sought or
imposed. Venezia's extradition to Dade County, Florida had been
requested by the United States, pursuant to the Treaty of Extradition, dated
October 13, 1983. Article IX of the treaty entitles Italy to request that
130. Lei Ch 'an Wa v. Portugal (App. No. 25410/94), unreported decision of November 27,
1995. See also: Yenng Yuk Lenng v. Portugal (App. No. 24464/94), unreported decision of
November 27, 1995; Cheong Meng v. Portugal (App. No. 25862/94), (1995) 83-A D.R. 88.
131. Raidl v. Austria (App. no. 25342/94), (1995) 82-A D.R. 134, at 145.
132. Fidan, (1987) II Receuil Dalloz-Sirey 305 (Conseil d'ttat); Gacem, (1988) I Semaine
juridique IV-86 (Conseil d'ttat). Fidan was cited by Judge De Meyer in his concurring opinion
in Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 119, at 51.
133. Short v. Netherlands, (1990) 76 Rechtspraak van de Week 358, (1990) 29 I.L.M.
1378.
134. Agreement Between the Parties to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, (1951) 199 U.N.T.S. 67. Note that on June 19, 1995 the States parties to the
NATO treaty finalized the Agreement among the State Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and
the Other States Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their Forces
together with an Additional Protocol. Article 1 of the Additional Protocol states:
Insofar as it has jurisdiction according to the provisions of the agreement, each State
party to the present additional protocol shall not carry out a death sentence with regard
to any member of a force and its civilian component, and their dependents from any
other state party to the present additional protocol.
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extradition be conditional upon an undertaking by the United States that the
death penalty not be imposed. The United States government gave
assurances in the form of a note verbale on July 28, 1994, August 24,
1995 and January 12, 1996. However, this was not enough for the
Constitutional Court.
According to the judgment of the Constitutional Court, "the
prohibition of capital punishment is of special importance - like all
sentences which violate humanitarian principles - in the first part of the
Constitution." The right to life is the first of the inviolable human rights
enshrined in Article 2. The judgment continues: "The absolute character
of this constitutional guarantee is of significance to the exercise of powers
attributed to all public authorities under the republican system, and
specifically with respect to international judicial cooperation for the
purposes of mutual judicial assistance." The Court notes that it has
already stated that the participation of Italy in punishments which cannot be
imposed within Italy in peacetime constitutes a breach of the Constitution.
Referring to the mechanism by which the Italian authorities
consider the sufficiency of the undertaking by the United States authorities,
not to impose capital punishment, the Court states:
Such a solution has the advantage of providing a flexible
solution for the requested State, and allows for policy to be
developed over time based on considerations of criminal
law policy; but in our system, where the prohibition of the
death penalty is enshrined in the Constitution, the formula
of 'sufficient assurances' - for the purpose of granting
extradition for crimes for which the death penalty is
provided in the legislation of the requesting State - is not
admissible from the standpoint of the Constitution. The
prohibition set out in paragraph 4 of article 27 of the
Constitution and the values that it expresses - foremost
among them being life itself - impose an absolute
guarantee.'3-
As a result, the Court declared provisions of the Code of Penal
Procedure designed to give effect to the extradition treaty between Italy
and the United States to be contrary to the Constitution. It also declared
that the portion of Law 225 of March 26, 1984, implementing article IX of
the extradition treaty, was unconstitutional. It noted, however, that Italian
law allowed for Venezia to be prosecuted by Italian courts for crimes
135. Id.
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committed abroad.'3' Venezia had also filed an application with the
European Commission of Human Rights. The Commission decided to
strike the case from its docket as a result of the judgment of the Italian
Constitutional Court. 137
Canadian courts have been reluctant to follow the European
precedents, although a recent judgment suggests that they will be increasingly
severe in granting extradition in capital cases. In United States of America v.
Burns and Rafay, 38 issued on June 30, 1997, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal overruled the decision of the Canadian Minister of Justice to allow
extradition in a capital offense without seeking an assurance that the death
penalty would be imposed. Article VI of the Extradition Treaty between
Canada and the United States declares:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting State
and the laws of the requested State do not permit such
punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused
unless the requesting State provides such assurances as the
requested State considers sufficient that the death penalty
shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.
Burns and Rafay were both eighteen at the time of the crime, a brutal
murder of Rafay's parents. They were charged by the State of Washington
with aggravated first degree murder, for which the Revised Code of
Washington, s. 10.95.030, provides a sentence of death. Canada abolished
the death penalty in 1976 for common law crimes. Although the death
penalty still exists under military law, it has not been imposed for more
than fifty years. A current revision of the National Defense Act will
probably eliminate capital punishment from the statute books altogether.
Justice Donald, writing for the majority of the Court, admitted that
he could not refuse extradition on the basis of section 12 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights of Freedoms,'3" which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment, or section 7 of the Charter, which enshrines the right to life,
given the 1991 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kindler v.
Canada.1' However, he concluded that because Burns and Rafay were
136. Id.
137. Venezia v. Italy (App. No. 29966/96), (1996) 87-A D.R. 140.
138. (1997) 116 C.C.C. (3d) 524 (B.C.C.A.).
139. R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 44.
140. Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 84 D.L.R. (4th) 438, 6
C.R.R. (2d) 193, 129 N.R. 81, 26 C.R. (4th) 1. On the Kindler decision, see: William A.
Schabas, Kindler v. Canada, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1993); Sharon A. Williams, Extradition
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Canadian citizens, their extradition would violate section 6(1) of the
Charter, which declares: "Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter,
remain in and leave Canada."' 4
As Justice Donald noted correctly, section 6(1) is subject to the
limitation clause of section 1, which instructs the courts to subject Charter
rights to the test of "reasonable limits in a free and democratic society."
Following an analytical approach developed by the European Court of
Human Rights in the application of similar provisions, 42 Canadian courts
consider whether the legal rule that violates the Charter right has a
legitimate purpose, and whether it constitutes a minimal infringement upon
the right in question. The Supreme Court of Canada has already
determined that extradition constitutes an acceptable limit on the right of
Canadians to remain in Canada. 4 3 According to Justice Donald, execution
of Burns and Rafay would clearly violate their right to return to Canada
upon completion of their sentence, something that extradition for non-
capital offenses would not. Given alternatives, specifically a sentence of
life imprisonment, it was clear that extradition without an assurance the
death penalty would not be imposed failed the minimal impairment test.
He wrote:
The simple point taken by the applicants in the present
case, with which I am in full agreement, is that their return
to Canada is impossible if they are put to death. . .. By
handing over the applicants to the American authorities
without an assurance, the Minister will maximally, not
minimally, impair the applicants' rights of citizenship.'"
Although bound by precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada that
allows the extradition of non-citizens for capital offenses - caselaw that,
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incidentally, has been criticized by other courts in other countries 54 -
Justice Donald is clearly opposed to extradition for capital offenses in
general. He writes:
With respect, the Minister appears to have given only lip
service to a fundamentally important aspect of Canadian
policy, namely, that we have decided through our elected
representatives that we will not put our killers to death...
Abolition reflected the will of the majority and their
concern for the sanctity of life and the dignity of the
person.'
He cites the reasons of Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory, who dissented
in Kindler, referring to the fact that Canada's Parliament rejected the death
penalty in two separate free votes. Criticizing the executive decision to
extradite Burns and Rafay without the assurance that capital punishment
will not be imposed, he says:
The Minister confesses his support for abolition but then
fails to act on his conviction. Apart from trying to have it
both ways, the problem with the Minister's thinking is that
he treats the policy question about the death penalty in
Canada as undecided and at large. This approach led him
to give effect to the minority view on the death penalty as
far as these applicants are concerned., 7
Justice Donald states that Article VI of the treaty "was drawn to
accommodate the difference between nations so that the requested State
could give effect to its policy of abolition.""'4 What he did not note is that,
ironically, Article VI was inserted in the Extradition Treaty in 1974 at the
demand of the United States, which had then abolished the death penalty
judicially. "4 9 This was at a time when Canadian law still allowed for capital
punishment."' Article VI was designed to protect Americans and not
145. Pratt et al. v. Attorney General for Jamaica et al., [19931 4 AII.E.R. 769, [1993] 2
L.R.C. 349, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 995, 43 W.I.R. 340, 14 H.R.L.J. 338, 33
I.L.M. 364 (J.C.P.C.).
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Canadians! Of course, since 1974 the United States has slid backwards'
while Canada has gone on to abolish the death penalty.
Burns is being appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. That
Court, in a four to three decision, authorized the extradition of Joseph
Kindler in 1991. Yet even the Kindler decision suggests its discomfort
with the death penalty, with six of the seven justices indicating that capital
punishment, were it to be imposed in Canada, would violate the right to
life and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
V. CONCLUSION
In his 1995 report to the Economic and Social Council,"' English
criminologist Roger Hood concluded that "there has been a considerable
shift towards the abolition of the death penalty both de jure and in
practice" in the years 1989-1993.11 After consulting other sources,
Professor Hood observed that "it appears that since 1989 twenty-four
countries have abolished capital punishment, twenty-two of them for all
crimes in peacetime or in wartime."'11 Over the same period, the death
penalty was reintroduced in four states.',5 Professor Hood stated that "the
picture that emerges is that an unprecedented number of countries have
abolished or suspended the use of the death penalty." 6  Amnesty
International issued revised figures in July 1997, which declared that
ninety-nine States have abolished the death penalty in law or in practice,
whereas ninety-four retain the death penalty. Amnesty adds that "the
number of countries which actually execute prisoners in any one year is
much smaller."' 7
Despite many decades of virtual indifference to international
human rights norms, and an unfortunate legacy of traditional isolationist
sentiments within the country's political constituency, in recent years the
United States of America has sought to ratify some of the major
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conventions and to play a role in treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights
Committee.' 8 President Jimmy Carter made an unsuccessful attempt to
ratify four of the principal instruments, but the issue stagnated during the
Reagan presidency. 9 President George Bush revived the matter and in
1988, the United States ratified the Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."°0 Four years later, instruments of
accession were produced at United Nations headquarters for the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'6' These instruments
were accompanied by a series of reservations, understandings and
declarations, aimed in part at the international norms dealing with
limitation and eventual abolition of the death penalty. In 1994, similar
statements were made upon ratification of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.'62
The American initiatives have been challenged by both its treaty partners
and by the Human Rights Committee, notably on the issue of the death
penalty.' 3 Indeed, the debate has undoubtedly given grist to the mill of
politicians who resent the entire international human rights system. The
consequences are that efforts to ratify other human rights treaties have
been stalled since early 1995. The issue of the death penalty stands as an
impediment to further efforts by the United States of America to play a full
role within international human rights institutions and treaty bodies. Given
public opinion that is largely favorable to the death penalty and a political
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leadership that chooses to follow rather than lead its electorate,,"
international pressure may well prove to be of decisive significance in
advancing the abolitionist agenda within the United States.
164. William J. Bowers, Margaret Vandiver, Patricia H. Dugan, A New Look at Public
Opinion on Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77
(1994).
[Vol. 4:535
